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Although systems of classification and organization are popular in the 
natural sciences, it is not so in law. Ever since the age of legal realism, and 
probably long before, a jurisprudence of concepts or ideas has fallen out 
of fashion in favor of a system focused upon the interests involved in a 
case. Resolving legal disputes in a fair and equitable manner has taken 
precedence over rigid conceptualizations as to what rules are applicable to 
what classes or categories of contracts. Casuistry, although not popular in 
many dogmatic conceptions of civil codes, is popular today. As the late 
Tony Weir once wrote:  
It is possible for us, like Hamlet, to tell a hawk from a handsaw, 
and to do so without a complete theory of aerial predators or an 
exhaustive inventory of the carpenter’s toolbox; furthermore, we 
can effect such telling without having a theory of telling, though 
the current fad of epistemology might lead one to doubt that (given 
a theory of doubting).1 
Certainly, the Romans would have agreed. In fact, this Article purports 
to follow the advice of Tony Weir and the example of Hamlet in 
distinguishing and explaining the various types of contracts that exist 
under the Louisiana Civil Code but without purporting to proffer a new 
theory of contracts that would necessarily harmonize them all. In fact, such 
a theory has eluded the drafters of the Louisiana Civil Code for the last 
200 years and, before them, French scholars and Roman jurists. Any 
attempted system would likely be unsatisfactory and, consequently, none 
shall be offered.  
The consequences of appropriate classification may not be obvious at 
first glance and, in fact, the usefulness of engaging in the exercise at all 
has varied throughout the ages. In Roman times, the matter of 
classification dictated the matter of enforceability.2 Without finding an 
appropriate class or box for an interaction to reside, the relationship 
between the parties risked unenforceability. Over the course of time, the 
                                                                                                             
 1. Tony Weir, Contracts in Rome and England, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1615, 1616 
(1992) (footnote omitted) (quoting Shakespeare: “I am but mad north-north-west. 
When the wind is southerly, I know a hawk from a handsaw.” WILLIAM 
SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act. 2, sc. 2, ll. 388–89). Hamlet’s reference to a “handsaw” 
may not be an allusion to the carpenter’s tool, but to another bird, the hernshaw. 1 
SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1224 (Lesley Brown ed., 1993). 
 2. JAMES GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW: PROPERTY, TORT, 
CONTRACT, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 287–89 (2006) [hereinafter GORDLEY, 
FOUNDATIONS]. 




matter changed as contracts became enforceable based upon their 
adherence to a general theory, such as the “will” theory, be it a subjective 
internalization requirement or an objective manifestation of consent. 
Nonetheless, much of the classificatory system inherited from the Romans 
has persisted.  
Although the civil law mind and civil law style eschew the types of 
definitions in the law that are necessary for classification,3 both the 
Louisiana and the French Civil Codes specify definitions for various types 
of classifications of contracts.4 The purpose behind classification of “legal 
concepts”—or in this case, contracts—has been persuasively discussed by 
the honoree of this Symposium, Professor Alain Levasseur, who has 
delineated three goals or purposes of classifying concepts. The first is “to 
be able to bring a given factual situation under a concept or another so that 
the factual situation will flow automatically from the proper classification 
under the appropriate concept.”5 Of course, this rationale would be 
rejected by those who believe that law should be more pragmatic and less 
doctrinaire or by those who reject the impartiality and coherence of legal 
analysis altogether.6 For others who prefer rigorous analysis and 
conceptual purity, however, knowing how to distinguish an immovable 
from a movable is necessary to determine the relevant law to apply in a 
given context, such as the requisite form of the contract needed for 
transfer.7 
A second reason Professor Levasseur gives for having an accurate 
classification scheme is “to protect against the danger of polysemy or a 
                                                                                                             
 3. E. Allan Farnsworth, A Common Lawyer’s View of His Civilian Colleagues, 
57 LA. L. REV. 227, 233 (1996). 
 4. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] arts. 1102−1107 (Fr.); LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1907−1916 
(2016). It has been suggested that the civil law’s resistance to the common law fetish 
of definitions as part of the law can be explained—along with lengthy and verbose 
legislative drafting—in part by the common law’s distrust of judges to properly 
interpret the law. Farnsworth, supra note 3, at 233. Other civil codes, such as the 
German and Japanese Civil Codes, have resisted the temptation to contain 
definitions. See, e.g., BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE] (Ger.) 
(containing no classificatory definitions of contracts); Akira Kamo, Crystallization, 
Unification, or Differentiation? The Japanese Civil Code (Law of Obligations) 
Reform Commission and Basic Reform Policy (Draft Proposals), 24 COLUM. J. 
ASIAN L. 171, 178 (2010). 
 5. ALAIN A. LEVASSEUR, LOUISIANA LAW OF CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS: A 
PRÉCIS 3 (2010). 
 6. See, e.g., JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN 
CONTRACT DOCTRINE 231−32 (1991) [hereinafter GORDLEY, PHILOSOPHICAL 
ORIGINS]. 
 7. Compare LA. CIV. CODE art. 1839, with id. art. 1846. 




possible plurality of meanings being given to the same word.”8 Without an 
accurate or definite statement as to a term’s meaning, the risk of muddled 
understandings and loose interpretations is great. Professor Levasseur 
cites the multiple meanings that could be given to the word “act” as an 
example. If the law were not precise in its classification of and use of the 
term “act,” there could be great risk of confusion between “juridical acts,” 
“written acts,” “physical acts,” and even perhaps “acts of nature,” all of 
which may not demand the same or similar legal treatment. Another 
example could be the characterization of some obligations as “personal” 
or “strictly personal.”9 Although these words distinguish obligations based 
on their heritability, courts and commentators have confused these terms 
with those that distinguish between obligations involving contractual 
rights generally and real ones involving property.10 
A third and final reason is “for purposes of education and legal 
analysis.”11 Indeed, the late Saúl Litvinoff, the Reporter for the 1984 
revision of the law of obligations, has acknowledged the “didactic” nature 
of the revisions.12 As has been remarked, “[a] civil code should contain 
doctrinal elements that explain the principles and rules and put them in 
context.”13 As much as for the lawyer as for the student and the citizen, the 
civil code should elucidate and explain the meaning, context, and scope of 
the law. 
With these three purposes in mind, this Article attempts to properly 
classify, consistently define, and accurately explain the Louisiana Civil 
Code’s approach to classifying contracts. The Civil Code articles on 
classification of contracts in Louisiana are generally known but little 
understood. Although many lawyers can recite the definitional difference 
between bilateral and onerous contracts, few could explain how the two 
differ and what difference, if any, their distinction makes in practice. Add 
to the confusion the concept of commutative contracts, whose definition 
                                                                                                             
 8. LEVASSEUR, supra note 5, at 3. 
 9. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1766. 
 10. Cf. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 422 (2016). For an example of the 
confusion, see Succession of Ricks, 893 So. 2d 98 (La. Ct. App. 2004). 
 11. LEVASSEUR, supra note 5, at 3. 
 12. Saúl Litvinoff, Introduction: The 1984 Revision of the Louisiana Civil 
Code’s Articles on Obligations – A Student Symposium, 45 LA. L. REV. 747, 748 
(1985). 
 13. Michael McAuley, The Pedagogical Code, 63 LA. L. REV. 1293, 1302 
(2003).  




appears to have changed over time, and even the most erudite lawyers, 
scholars, and judges are left to speculate as to what the drafters intended.14  
To compound this challenge, the revision process of the Louisiana Civil 
Code, although salutary in many ways, has at times magnified the confusion. 
The Louisiana Civil Code has been undergoing a comprehensive revision 
since 1976. The process for doing so has been caustically but accurately 
described as “piecemeal,”15 often with the right hand not knowing what the 
left is doing. One subject matter committee is charged to revise the law of 
“contracts” and another to rewrite the law of “sales” and yet another to 
rewrite the law of “deposit.”16 Indeed, in recent times, the granularity and 
specialization of committees has approached an almost microscopic level, 
with some committees designed to cover a single civil code article17 or a 
single concept.18 Although membership on committees is often overlapping, 
consistency in approach and concepts, if it exists, is not uniform.19 This has, 
regrettably, led the Louisiana Civil Code to adopt rules in one section that 
do not always coordinate with the rules and principles in other sections. 
Thus, one area of the Civil Code may be revised, and a classificatory term 
may be discarded or changed without a full appreciation of its connection to 
or impact on other areas of the Civil Code. 
Doctrine in many instances has filled the legislative gaps and helped 
explain some of the confusion. With respect to the rules on classification of 
contracts, however, virtually no doctrine exists since the recodification of 
1984.20 This Article hopes to fill that gap, beginning with a background of 
                                                                                                             
 14. LEVASSEUR, supra note 5, at 8 (“What does ‘correlative’ mean and how 
can its meaning fit in the definition of both [Louisiana Civil Code articles] 1908 
and 1911?”). 
 15. A.N. Yiannopoulos, Requiem for a Civil Code: A Commemorative Essay, 
78 TUL. L. REV. 379, 397 (2003); see generally Vernon V. Palmer, The Death of 
a Code – The Birth of a Digest, 63 TUL. L. REV. 221 (1988). 
 16. See generally Committees, LA. ST. L. INST., http://www.lsli.org/committees 
#18 (last visited Feb. 5, 2016). 
 17. See, e.g., id. at “Component Parts Committee” (constituted to revise 
article 466 of the Civil Code). 
 18. See, e.g., id. at “Counterletter Committee” (formed to respond to a 
specific legislative resolution proposing to abolish counterletters). 
 19. Although the Council of the Law Institute and the Coordinating and 
Semantics Committee are designed to achieve some form of uniformity, the Council 
membership is vast and changing from meeting to meeting, and the resources and 
time available to the Coordinating and Semantics Committee are very limited. For 
membership of both, see generally id.; Council Members, LA. ST. L. INST., 
http://www.lsli.org/council-members (last visited Feb. 5, 2016).  
 20. One notable exception is contained in Professor Levasseur’s Louisiana 
Law of Conventional Obligations: A Précis. See LEVASSEUR, supra note 5, at 3–




the Roman and French rules on classification of contracts to lay a 
foundation for understanding the rules specific in the Louisiana Civil 
Code. Although helpful, those Roman and French rules have not been 
well-understood and suffer from a number of defects or limitations. 
Subsequent revisions throughout the Louisiana Civil Code have proceeded 
without a firm foundation of this classification scheme, which has made 
harmonization and application of the existing scheme even more complex. 
Although the bulk of this Article is a critique of Louisiana law’s current 
classification of contracts, it is not dogmatic in its approach. The hope and 
purpose is to elucidate and clarify the current classificatory scheme for 
contracts in Louisiana while also demonstrating the imperfect nature of 
any scheme and the need for flexibility.  
I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF ROMAN CONTRACT CLASSIFICATIONS 
The Romans had no general theory of contracts but, rather like the 
English, created enforceable contracts in certain situations when specific 
circumstances required.21 Indeed, some have classified the eight 
specifically enforceable Roman contracts as “ris[ing] like islands in the 
sea, an archipelago not a single continent.”22 These islands, however, were 
originally an unforgiving lot. Failure to moor one’s boat on an island 
risked the death of a transaction. Stated more straightforwardly, failure to 
fall within one of the classes of contract did not, like modern law, mean 
that a different set of rules might apply. Rather, it meant that the 
transaction was not enforceable at all. These eight classes of contracts, 
which covered “the whole range of commercial and social life,” provided 
a definitive—even if later unsatisfactory—answer to the question of 
“[w]hat promises are binding at law.”23 Because this terrain is so well-
                                                                                                             
4. For older pre-revision works on this topic, see SAÚL LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS, 
in 6 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 139–208 (1969); Andrew J.S. Jumonville, 
Comment, Personal Services About the Home, 23 LA. L. REV. 416 (1963); J. 
Denson Smith, A Refresher Course in Cause, 12 LA. L. REV 2, 15–29 (1951); 
Leonard Oppenheim, Comment, The Unilateral Contract in the Civil Law and in 
Louisiana, 16 TUL. L. REV. 456 (1942). 
 21. THE ROMAN LAW READER 91–144 (F.H. Lawson ed., 1969); PETER 
BIRKS, THE ROMAN LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 30 (Eric Descheemaeker ed., 2014); 
Weir, supra note 1, at 1616; GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 2, at 290. For 
an overview of Roman contract law, see W.W. BUCKLAND, THE MAIN 
INSTITUTIONS OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 253–80 (1931); ALAN WATSON, THE 
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS IN THE LATER ROMAN REPUBLIC (1965). 
 22. BIRKS, supra note 21, at 30. 
 23. Id. at 29–30; Alan Watson, The Evolution of Law: The Roman System of 
Contracts, 2 LAW & HIST. REV. 1, 8 (1984). 




ploughed, there is no need to re-till the field here. A brief overview of the 
classification of Roman contracts, however, is helpful and perhaps 
essential background for understanding the system of classification that 
prevails today. 
A. Consensual Contracts 
There were four consensual contracts at Roman law—sale (emptio-
venditio), hire (locatio-conductio), partnership (societas), and mandate 
(mandatum)—so called because they were enforceable by the mere 
consent of the parties without any other formality.24 Although this feature 
alone does not strike the modern mind as noteworthy, the importance can 
be seen in comparison to contracts re, where consent was not key because 
no contract existed unless a thing (a res) was also actually delivered. 
Undoubtedly, the consensual contract classification was the most 
important in Roman law, both in terms of its commonality and in terms of 
its scope.25 Lawson has noted that the modern concept of contract sprang 
from the Roman class of consensual contracts.26 As no rigid formalities 
were required, consent was their foundation. Unlike a number of other 
contracts, the consensual ones gave rise to actions that allowed the judge 
to grant the plaintiff relief for whatever was due to him, not under the terms 
of the contract or the strict law, but under good faith (ex fide bona).27 
B. Contracts Re 
Like consensual contracts, there were four distinct contracts re. They 
were mutuum (loan for consumption), commodatum (loan for use), depositum 
(deposit), and pignus (pledge).28 In contrast to consensual contracts, the 
commonality of these contracts was that no contract existed until delivery of 
the thing loaned, deposited, or pledged. Once delivery occurred, an 
enforceable contract arose. In fact, an agreement to make a deposit, confect a 
loan for use or consumption, or offer a pledge was unenforceable at Roman 
law as a nudum pactum. Barry Nicholas notes that “real contracts” were 
probably not as important to Roman law as their prominence in some 
Justinianic texts suggests.29 After all, only pignus (pledge) was really a 
                                                                                                             
 24. JUSTINIAN’S INSTITUTES §§ 3.13.22–26 (Peter Birks & Grant McLeod 
trans., 1987). 
 25. See THE ROMAN LAW READER, supra note 21, at 93–94. 
 26. Id. at 94. 
 27. Id. at 104. 
 28. JUSTINIAN’S INSTITUTES, supra note 24, § 3.3.14. 
 29. BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 169 (1962). 




commercial transaction.30 The others—loan and deposit—were 
uncompensated and thus ordinarily took place between friends.31 
C. Contracts Verbis 
A contract verbis is a contract “made by word of mouth.”32 Although 
not the only type of contract verbis, the stipulatio was the most 
important.33 The stipulatio was a simple method “in which any 
undertaking could be rendered binding, provided it were not substantially 
improper as involving a wrong or unacceptable as burdening a right.”34 
Many believed the stipulatio was a “very ancient contract” going “back to 
the time of the Twelve Tables.”35 This contract was an oral exchange of 
promises that likely required the use of certain solemn or special words.36 
It was a stricti iuris contract, as opposed to one subject to good faith, 
meaning that it was not subject to “equitable defenses” or any “implied 
obligations” and “never offered much protection beyond its express 
terms.”37 Although the stipulatio has no equivalent in modern law, it has 
been characterized as one of the devices that met the need for a general 
theory of contract because it “could be adapted to any content” and any 
circumstance.38  
D. Contracts Litteris 
The contract litteris was a contract made by a writing.39 This type of 
contract seems a bit obscure to the modern mind and, even in Roman 
times, its application seems to have been limited. Alan Watson provides a 
helpful explanation of this type of contract: 
We have no real indications of how or when or to what end the 
literal contract arose, and hence no argument can be drawn from 
it for or against any theory of the growth of Roman contract law. 
It was in existence by around the beginning of the first century 
B.C. but may well be much older. In classical law it arose when a 
                                                                                                             
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. BIRKS, supra note 21, at 52. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Weir, supra note 1, at 1618. 
 35. BIRKS, supra note 21, at 53. 
 36. Id. at 53–57. 
 37. Id. at 58. 
 38. Id. at 30. 
 39. Id. at 38. 




Roman head of family marked in his account books that a debt had 
been paid when it had not, then made an entry to the effect that a 
loan had been made when it had not. Thus it was not an originating 
contract but a method of transforming one kind of obligation into 
another. Whether that was also the case when the literal contract 
first came into being, and whether in the beginning the writing had 
to be in the formal account books is not clear. The action was the 
actio certae pecuniae, and therefore had to be for a fixed amount 
of money.40  
Although the contract litteris flourished in the mid to late first century 
A.D., “when the eruption of Vesuvius destroyed Pompeii, . . . it had 
apparently disappeared from use by the end of the classical period.”41 Its 
relevance in modern law is nonexistent. 
E. Innominate Contracts 
Despite the apparent completeness of the four-fold division of 
contracts identified above and delineated in Justinian’s Institutes, the 
classification was “imperfect” and thus another category was created—the 
so-called innominate contracts.42 Innominate contracts were “agreements 
which did not fall under one of four accepted categories of contracts, but 
were thought worthy of enforceability by the praetor.”43 Innominate 
contracts were not enforceable merely by virtue of consent, but became 
“enforceable only on part performance,”44 that is, when one party 
performed his end of the agreement but the other party did not. Somewhat 
counterintuitively, the category of innominate contracts is populated by 
many contracts, most of which had names—specifically, the transactio, 
the aestimatum, the permutatio, and the precarium.45 Although only the 
transactio and permutatio exist today as the compromise46 and exchange47 
contracts, the precarium and the aestimatum were peculiarly Roman law 
institutions. They consisted of a grant of use of property for a period of 
                                                                                                             
 40. Watson, supra note 23, at 14. 
 41. Id.  
 42. THE ROMAN LAW READER, supra note 21, at 96. 
 43. A COMPANION TO JUSTINIAN’S INSTITUTES 168 (Ernest Metzger ed., 1998). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 169. 
 46. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3071 (2016) (“A compromise is a contract whereby 
the parties, through concessions made by one or more of them, settle a dispute or 
an uncertainty concerning an obligation or other legal relationship.”). 
 47. Id. art. 2660 (“Exchange is a contract whereby each party transfers to the 
other the ownership of a thing other than money.”). 




time48 and an agreement to give property to another under the obligation 
to pay an estimated price or return the goods,49 respectively.  
F. The Relevance of the Roman System for Louisiana Law 
In many ways, the Roman system of contract classification is an 
interesting historical vestige that seems only slightly relevant to Louisiana 
law. Surely, there are no contracts litteris in Louisiana law. The stipulatio 
may perhaps be an ancestor of many Louisiana contracts, but no longer 
exists in any recognizable form today. Contracts re and consensual 
contracts, however, still have some saliency, not in terms of their 
enforceability but in terms of their classification. Consensual contracts, 
such as sale, are enforceable as a sale even before the price is paid or the 
thing delivered, which are subsequent obligations imposed on the buyer 
and seller, respectively.50 Contracts re, such as deposit, however, still 
require both “delivery of the thing” and consent to be enforceable as a 
deposit.51 Before the thing is delivered, Louisiana law notes that “there is 
no contract of deposit, but there may be a variety of legal relations between 
the parties,” such as “offers to enter into a contract of deposit,” a contract 
to deposit, or “unilateral promises to deliver or to accept a thing in 
deposit.”52 
Modern Louisiana law, like Roman law, also recognizes the existence 
of consensual contracts. In fact, all of Louisiana contract law in general—
unlike Roman contract law—is founded upon consent. Article 1927 makes 
clear that “[a] contract is formed by the consent of the parties.”53 Although 
unnecessary now, the nominate contracts of sale and lease still contain the 
definitional vestige of consent. A sale contract is formed upon agreement 
of price and thing, even before the price is paid or the thing delivered.54 
Moreover, “[t]he consent of the parties as to the thing and the rent is 
                                                                                                             
 48. 4 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN bk. 43, ch. 26, para. 1 (Alan Watson trans. & 
ed., 1998) [hereinafter DIGEST]. 
 49. For discussion of this innominate contract, as well as extensive discussion 
of other Roman contracts and their development, see REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, 
THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF THE CIVILIAN TRADITION 
535–36 (1992).  
 50. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2475, 2549. 
 51. Id. art 2929. 
 52. Id. art. 2929 cmt. b. 
 53. Id. art. 1927. 
 54. Id. art. 2456; INSTITUTES OF ROMAN LAW BY GAIUS § 3.139 (Edward 
Poste trans., E.A. Whittuck ed., 4th ed. 1904); DIGEST, supra note 48, bk. 18, ch. 
1, para. 2. 




essential . . . for a contract of lease.”55 Although the foundational article 
on mandate no longer specifies the consent element,56 the comments to the 
articles on partnership still make clear that “[t]he consensual element 
underlying the creation of a partnership distinguishes it.”57  
Just as in Roman law, mutuum, commodatum, depositum, and pignus 
in Louisiana law still require delivery of the thing for the existence of the 
transaction. A loan for consumption under Louisiana law is “a contract by 
which a person, the lender, delivers consumable things to another, the 
borrower, who binds himself to return to the lender an equal amount of 
things of the same kind and quality.”58 Similarly, a loan for use “is a 
gratuitous contract by which a person, the lender, delivers a 
nonconsumable thing to another, the borrower, for him to use and 
return.”59 Likewise, a deposit is “a contract by which a person, the 
depositor, delivers a movable thing to another person, the depositary, for 
safekeeping under the obligation of returning it to the depositor upon 
demand.”60 Similarly, the contract of pledge requires delivery of the thing 
pledged, unless the object is not a corporeal moveable.61 Prior law also 
made clear that “[t]he pledge is a contract by which one debtor gives 
something to his creditor as security for his debt.”62 
Although innominate contracts exist under Louisiana law, they are not 
the innominate contracts of Roman law. Innominate contracts under 
Louisiana law are truly contracts “with no special designation,”63 such as 
an agreement to provide a home and burial for a relative in exchange for 
the transfer of property.64 In Roman law, the term “innominate” contracts 
refers not to the contracts themselves, which were quite nominate, but to 
                                                                                                             
 55. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2668. 
 56. Id. arts. 2998–3032; see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 2988 (1870) (“The 
contract of mandate is completed only by the acceptance of the mandatary.”). 
 57. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2801 cmt. a (2016); see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 2805 
(1870) (“Partnerships must be created by consent of the parties.”). 
 58. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2904 (2016). 
 59. Id. art. 2891. 
 60. Id. art. 2926. 
 61. Id. art. 3149. 
 62. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3133 (1870). 
 63. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1914 (2016). 
 64. Thielman v. Gahlman, 44 So. 123 (La. 1907). At the time of Domat, the 
consignment contract also appears to have been innominate. “There are likewise 
some covenants which have no proper name; as if one person gives to another a 
thing to sell at a certain price, on condition that he shall keep to himself whatever 
he gets over and above the price that is fixed.” 1 JEAN DOMAT, THE CIVIL LAW IN 
ITS NATURAL ORDER 162 (William Strahan trans., Luther S. Cushing ed., 1850). 




the category of contracts that had no name but were subsumed together in 
a rather rag-tag group.65  
All of these classificatory systems, however, operate today in the 
background. Although Louisiana law does not distinguish contracts based 
upon these terms, an understanding of their origins is helpful in assessing 
consequences and evaluating definitions. A more general theory of 
contract formation has displaced these categories, but new categories have 
arisen to take the place of the old ones. 
II. MEDIEVAL LAW AND THE ABANDONMENT OF THE ROMAN SYSTEM 
Given the disappearance of the Roman system in the void of the dark 
ages, little development occurred on the Roman classification system after 
Justinian. With the re-engagement of Roman law and the rediscovery of 
the Digest in the thirteenth century, hope for further refinement began 
anew. Medieval jurists and even early modern ones tried for some time to 
retain the Roman system of classification,66 even though the Roman 
system of classification was unquestionably lacking and had been roundly 
criticized.67 The eventual disappearance, some have suggested, was not 
due to the impracticability of the Roman system but to the 
reconceptualization and reorganization of contract law by the late 
scholastics.68  
It is true that the absence of a general theory of contract likely put 
pressure on the Roman system to evolve, but recall that the stipulatio was 
flexible enough to adapt to any situation.69 Additionally, the Roman 
reluctance to enforce innominate contracts probably was not a significant 
obstacle for the medieval jurists because such contracts were routinely 
made enforceable by blessing them with the notarial seal.70 But as flexible 
as the stipulatio may have been, it still involved what many would likely 
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have regarded as an “irksome” formality, “however slight and simple.”71 
Moreover, the stipulatio was stricti iuris, meaning that the contract was 
“judged according to strict law” and did not have the benefit of more 
equitable remedies that would become important and that might be 
available to contracts governed by bona fides (good faith).72 
Scholars have noted that the late scholastic philosophers rejected the 
Roman scheme of distinguishing between consensual contracts and real 
contracts and between nominate and innominate ones as a classificatory 
system not relevant to modern law and useful only in explaining Roman 
law.73 Rather, they “explained the binding force of promises in terms of 
the Aristotelian virtues of promise-keeping, liberality, and commutative 
justice.”74 The important consideration became not so much finding the 
right classification or fact scenario for enforcing a contract, but rather 
whether the parties had made promises to be bound.75 This, of course, was 
not news to the medieval canon lawyers who had long believed that 
breaking a promise was wrong, but the Roman law had historically denied 
a legal remedy for promise-breaking, unless it otherwise fell within one of 
the recognized and allowable forms for contracting.76 As Jim Gordley has 
aptly observed,  
The Roman rules about which contracts were binding when were 
dismissed as matters of Roman private law, and eventually, by 
legislation or judicial decision, most of them vanished. The late 
scholastics developed a theory based on Aristotelian ideas of 
voluntary action . . . The distinguished two basic types of 
contracts: contracts to make a gift, which were intended to enrich 
the other party, and were acts of the Aristotelian virtue of 
liberality; and contracts to exchange, which were voluntary acts 
of commutative justice requiring equality so that at the moment of 
the transaction, neither party was enriched at the other’s 
expense.77 
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This distinction between acts of liberality and acts of exchange or 
commutative justice were used to “restructure the law of particular 
contracts.”78 For transactions involving an exchange:  
[T]he parties had to exchange at a just price—a price that enriched 
neither party at the other’s expense. . . . If one of the parties had 
wanted to enrich the other at his own expense, he would have 
made a gift. The very nature of a contract of exchange is that the 
parties exchange equivalents. . . . According to Aquinas, relief was 
given only for large deviations from the just price, because human 
law could not command all acts of virtue.79 
Grotius, and later Puffendorf, continued the debate and discussions on 
this topic that had animated the late scholastics.80 Grotius sets his work in 
opposition to François de Connan, who maintained that “no obligation is 
created by those agreements which do not contain an exchange of 
considerations.”81 Grotius rejected this view and instead emphasized the 
role of the internal will or desire in serving as the primary forces behind 
agreements.82 Puffendorf noted the debate between Grotius and “Connanus 
the Civilian,”83 and endorsed the position of Grotius. Puffendorf agreed that 
“consent” was the hallmark principle for the binding effect of promises and 
pacts. He noted that:  
Since the regular effect of pacts and promises is to abridge and 
refrain our liberty, . . . there can be no better argument to hinder a 
man from complaining of this burden, than to alledge, [sic] that he 
took it upon him by his own free will and consent, when he had 
full power to refute it.84 
In short, the medieval period was important in reorienting contract law. 
Contract law slowly but unquestionably moved from the Roman casuistic 
system of specific types of classes of contracts to a philosophically oriented 
system based upon promise keeping, justice, and the importance of the will. 
The Roman concepts, however, were not completely abandoned. Rather, 
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“[a] synthesis between Roman law and Aristotelian and Thomistic moral 
philosophy was finally achieved in the sixteenth and early seventeenth 
centuries.”85  
III. THE FRENCH SYSTEM OF CLASSIFICATION 
Given the philosophical reorientation that occurred in medieval times, 
by the time the French Code Civil was drafted, the treatise writers who 
were heavily relied upon by the French all conclusively stated that 
“consent” was the hallmark of a contract. Domat makes clear that 
“[c]ovenants are perfected by the mutual consent of the parties, which they 
give to one another reciprocally.”86 Similarly, Pothier unequivocally states 
that a contract is a kind of an agreement, and “[a]n agreement is the 
consent of two or more persons.”87 Other scholars have long observed the 
influence of Domat and Pothier in orienting the Code Civil around a 
concept of “voluntarism” but noted that the true binding force of a contract 
for them both appears not to be the autonomy of the human will, but to be 
something external to man—such as an obligation of conscience to uphold 
one’s word.88 Indeed, this mindset is evident in the Code Civil, which 
notes that contractual freedom is subordinated not only to law but to public 
order and good morals.89 Pothier, like the scholastic philosophers before 
him, rejects the Roman classification of contracts. Still, however, he sees 
the need to classify contracts, even in the face of a general theory of 
contracts. Pothier explains that in France, contracts can be divided into 
five classes: (1) synallagmatic and unilateral; (2) consensual and real; (3) 
contracts of mutual interest, beneficence, or mixed contracts; (4) principal 
and accessory; and (5) those regulated by the civil law and those regulated 
by “mere natural justice.”90 
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Despite the importance of Pothier’s influence, not all of his 
classification scheme was actually adopted by the drafters of the French 
Code Civil. Articles 1102 through 1106 present three separate classes of 
contracts: (1) bilateral and unilateral, which is distinguished based upon 
whether the parties assume reciprocal obligations;91 (2) commutative and 
aleatory, based upon what is given—either the equivalent in the case of a 
commutative contract or the chance of gain or loss in the context of an 
aleatory one;92 and (3) contracts of beneficence and onerous contracts, 
distinguished upon what each party gives.93 The classification system 
adopted by the French Code Civil begins the title on contracts, which 
“comprises all types of contracts” and is necessary to show which types of 
Roman contracts the French Code Civil accepted and which ones it 
rejected as not useful.94  
A contract is synallagmatic or bilateral when the parties assume 
reciprocal obligations, such as in a sale, lease, or partnership.95 It is unilateral 
when only one party takes on an obligation, such as in a loan for use, 
mandate, or deposit.96 Toullier, however, is critical of this distinction, 
labeling it “imperfect” and suggesting that some unilateral contracts impose 
reciprocal obligations as well.97 Those cases, however, involve obligations 
that are not principal obligations of the contract and do not arise immediately 
at the time of contract formation.98 Other scholars have observed that this 
intermediate classification of imperfect synallagmatic contracts has been 
recognized by the courts and results from a contract that was “originally 
unilateral . . . [but] becomes synallagmatic when the other party became 
liable during the life of the contracts.” This occurs when a gratuitous 
depositary expends money to preserve the property for which 
reimbursement will be due.99 In these obligations, the obligation on the 
part of one party is only “eventual or accidental” and often does not exist 
at all.100 
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Commutative and aleatory contracts, on the other hand, have a 
different distinction. Commutative contracts are those in which what is 
given or done is regarded as the equivalent of what is given or done by the 
reciprocal party, such as in a sale or exchange.101 In aleatory contracts, 
however, “the equivalent consists in the chance of gain or of loss for each 
of the parties, after an eventual uncertainty.”102 Contracts of insurance are 
a classic example of an aleatory contract.103 Toullier is also critical of this 
distinction, noting that it is of little utility but explaining that in 
commutative contracts equivalent things can be exchanged, equivalent 
acts can be performed, or equivalent things can be given in exchange for 
acts. In this sense, he notes that an aleatory contract can be commutative 
because one party exchanges a thing, such as money, in return for a 
hope.104 
Finally, contracts can be onerous or gratuitous. Gratuitous contracts 
are those in which one of the parties procures from the other a purely 
gratuitous advantage, such as in a deposit, mandate, or donation.105 
Onerous contracts are those in which each of the parties gives or does 
something, such as in a sale, lease, or loan for interest.106 Toullier also 
suggests a blend of these categories is possible and notes that some 
contracts are mixed, such as when the motives could be partly onerous and 
partly gratuitous, as when a donation is subject to a charge.107 
Writing in the mid-nineteenth century, Demolombe also follows the 
French Code Civil but adds two extra categories: (1) nominate and 
innominate; and (2) principal and accessory.108 The former category is 
hinted at by article 1107 of the French Code Civil, which discusses those 
contracts that “have a proper denomination” and “those that have not.” 
The latter category of principal and accessory is a doctrinal innovation.  
Modern French scholarship109 recognizes a general category of 
consensual contracts and exceptional ones in which delivery of object is 
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also required—such as real contracts—and those in which consent is 
subordinated to some solemnity—such as solemn contracts.110 Still other 
divisions include contracts of mutual agreement (gré a gré) and contracts of 
adhesion;111 individual and collective contracts;112 contracts of instantaneous 
execution and those of successive execution;113 civil contracts and 
commercial ones;114 and professional ones and consumer contracts.115 
The practical significance of these many classifications is not obvious, 
and the importance of each division varies. Planiol suggests that the 
difference between bilateral and unilateral contracts is “very important”;116 
that the distinction between onerous and gratuitous ones is “somewhat 
delicate”;117 and that the distinction between commutative and aleatory 
ones is “hardly of any importance.”118 
The sheer number of categories seems to have expanded to such an 
extent that one may long for the old Roman system. That being said, some 
commentators have attempted to explain the function of this categorization, 
which, given the advent of the will theory, now no longer has anything to 
do with the enforceability vel non of the contract. Bilateral contracts differ 
from unilateral ones as to the benefit from the laws pertaining to 
interdependence of obligations, such as the defense of non-performance.119 
Gratuitous contracts differ from onerous ones in that they generally 
impose a lesser degree of care and often require a higher degree of form 
in formation.120 Gratuitous contracts also are more easily challenged 
through the Paulienne action and more easily rescindable due to mistake 
as to identity of the other party.121 Commutative contracts are 
distinguishable from aleatory ones insofar as commutative contracts are 
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subject to rescission on the basis of lesion.122 Nominate contracts differ 
from innominate ones insofar as special rules, in addition to the general rules 
of contract, govern their operation.123 Consensual, real, and solemn 
contracts can be distinguished from one another because consent alone is 
sufficient to form a consensual contract whereas real or solemn contracts 
require either delivery or an extra formality for enforceability.124 
“Consensual contracts are the rule whereas real and solemn contracts are the 
exception.”125 Adhesionary contracts, unlike those of mutual agreement, 
may be subject to special rules under the Consumer Code, Insurance Code, 
and Labor Code.126 Individual and collective contracts differ from each 
other in terms of whose consent is necessary for its formation. Individual 
consent is required for ordinary individual contracts, but collective ones can 
be formed even without the consent of each party affected.127 Instantaneous 
contracts are different from successive ones because the latter contains 
special rules on termination.128 Professional contracts are different from 
consumer ones because consumer ones are subject to special protective 
consumer law.129 Finally, commercial contracts, unlike civil ones, are 
subject to special rules, among which is a relaxation of the evidence rules 
for proof of contracts.130 In the end, the French system of classification is 
complex but does appear to have some relevance in the modern day. It 
does not, like the Roman system, dictate enforceability, but it may, in some 
instances, dictate outcome.  
IV. THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE’S CLASSIFICATION OF CONTRACTS 
Relying heavily on French law, the Louisiana Civil Code sets up a 
number of dichotomies for classification of contracts. The juxtaposition of 
various types of contracts, such as unilateral and bilateral, often provides 
insight into understanding the opposite sides of the juridical terrain. In 
other instances, however, the dichotomy is less clear, such as the 
distinction between commutative and aleatory contracts. The provisions in 
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Louisiana law have arrived by way of France but do contain “some curious 
anomalies.”131 In the Digest of 1808, the provisions on classifying 
contracts appear to be almost verbatim copies of the provisions of the Code 
Napoleon,132 although the de La Vergne manuscript cites the influence of 
Pothier, which seems obvious at least in later revisions.133  
A dramatic expansion from the French system of five articles to one 
that included thirteen articles and new categories of “certain” and 
“independent” contracts occurred in 1825 and was perpetuated under the 
1870 Code.134 From whence came the new categories added in 1825 is still 
a mystery. The redactors mention in the projet to the revision that the goal 
was to correct inaccuracies and to provide “a better plan of distribution.”135 
Although Batiza references Pothier as the source for the new articles and 
categories,136 Pothier’s influence is not evident.137 Neither Domat nor 
Toullier, two other French scholars from whom the redactors freely 
borrowed, seem fruitful either.138 Whatever their source, the classificatory 
schemes in 1825 were paired in terms of their “parties,” their “substance,” 
their “motive,” and their “effects.”139 When considering the parties in the 
contract, one party “does, or engages to do or not to do,” while the other 
receives the performance.140 When the “latter party make[s] no express 
agreement on his part,” the contracts is unilateral.141 “[W]hen the parties 
expressly enter into mutual engagements,” the contract is bilateral.142 
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When the “substance” of a contract is considered, contracts are “either 
commutative or independent, principal or accessory.”143 
The motive of the parties serves as the basis for distinguishing 
gratuitous contracts from onerous ones.144 When the cause of a contract is 
to “benefit the person with whom it is made, without any profit or advantage, 
received or promised as a consideration for it,” it is gratuitous.145 The 
contract is onerous when something is “given or promised as a consideration 
for” the performance, even if what is given or promised is of “unequal” 
value.146 
Finally, considering “effects,” contracts are either certain or aleatory.147 
A contract is aleatory when it “depends on an uncertain event,” and it is 
certain “when the thing to be done is supposed to depend on the will of the 
party, or when in the usual course of events it must happen in the manner 
stipulated.”148 
The modern Louisiana Civil Code, as amended in the 1984 Obligations 
revision, abandoned the expansion created by the 1825 revision and returned 
to an approach more similar to the French Code Civil. The reason for the 
compression, just as the reason for the expansion, remains unclear. What is 
clear is that Louisiana law now contains a series of five sets or types of 
contracts: unilateral and bilateral; onerous and gratuitous; commutative and 
aleatory; principal and accessory; and nominate and innominate. Most 
obviously, the distinctions between commutative and independent 
contracts, as well as the contrast between aleatory and certain contracts, 
have disappeared. Rather, commutative and aleatory seem to have returned 
to their historical place as counterparts. Regardless of the origin of the 
change, each of these distinctions will be considered below, but each is not 
of equal importance. Some of the distinctions are necessary for certain 
contractual defenses, such as dissolution or nonperformance. Others are 
important for assessing standards of care, degrees of form, and norms of 
capacity. Still others are subject to entire legal regimes by virtue of their 
special nomination. Finally, some cannot even exist without supporting 
contracts or legal relations to reinforce their existence.  
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A. Unilateral and Bilateral 
One important distinction between contracts under the Louisiana Civil 
Code is that between unilateral and bilateral contracts, a distinction under 
the 1870 Code based upon the parties. Like the French classification, a 
contract is unilateral when only one party accepts an obligation and the 
other party does not assume a reciprocal one.149 On the other hand, a 
bilateral or synallagmatic contract150 gives rise to reciprocal obligations on 
behalf of both parties to the contract.151 This dichotomy in Louisiana does 
not admit of gradations, as neither Louisiana law nor Louisiana doctrine 
recognizes the French concept of imperfectly bilateral contracts. Rather, a 
contract is unilateral or bilateral based upon the essence or nature of the 
obligations entailed in the contract. Donations, mandates, and loans, are 
classic cases of unilateral contracts, whereas sales, leases, and exchanges 
are classic instances of bilateral contracts.  
Donations are unilateral because the donor is obligated to deliver the 
thing to the donee, but the donee has no reciprocal obligation.152 Mandates 
are unilateral for a similar reason: because the mandatary must “transact 
one or more affairs for the principal,” who does not assume a reciprocal 
obligation toward the mandatary.153 Loans for use are also unilateral 
because the borrower must “use and return” the thing lent, but the lender 
is not reciprocally obligated.154 At this point, the Anglo-American lawyer 
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is almost hardwired to resist with the reasonable criticism that loans under 
the above dichotomy seem unilateral only if they are executed rather than 
executory. In other words, if one considers a loan transaction at a point in 
time before the money or thing is lent, then each party does indeed appear 
to have reciprocal obligations—the lender to lend the money and the 
borrower to repay it (either with or without interest). Although such a 
criticism is plausible, it misunderstands the conceptual basis of the 
contract of loan. Both under Roman law and Louisiana law, a loan contract 
is not a consensual contract like a sale or lease. Rather a loan contract is a 
real contract or a contract re and thus not a contract of loan at all until a 
thing is lent. Barry Nicholas reminds us that:  
In the Roman view the real contracts came into existence when the 
thing (res) was delivered to the borrower, who then came under an 
obligation to return it (or, in a loan for consumption, its equivalent) 
at the appointed time. In terms of the distinction which we are 
discussing this is a unilateral contract, the borrower having a duty 
(to return the money) and the lender a correlative right, but not vice 
versa. Until delivery of the thing there is no contract . . . .155 
Similarly, in Louisiana, the very definition of a loan requires delivery 
of the thing lent.156 Parties are, of course, free to enter into the consensual 
contract of a “contract to lend,” whereby each party by virtue of the 
manifestations of their consent agrees to accept mutual or reciprocal 
obligations.157 At Roman law, however, such an agreement would not “be 
a contract because it is not one of the four ‘consensual’ contracts (and is 
not clothed in the form of the stipulatio).”158 Thus, an executory loan is 
not a bilateral loan because it is not a loan at all, although it may be a 
contract to lend. 
Although the distinction between unilateral and bilateral contracts in 
Louisiana law is not as significant as in French law, distinctions do exist, 
primarily in the areas of default and consent. With respect to putting an 
obligor in default for failure to perform, an obligor in a bilateral contract 
may not be put in default unless the obligor of the other has performed or 
is ready to perform his own obligation.159 For example, in Retail 
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Merchants Ass’n v. Forrester, the court appropriately held that a hospital 
could not put a patient in default and seek full payment from him for medical 
services when it failed to perform its obligation under the contract of timely 
notifying the patient’s health insurer.160 Similarly, nonperformance by one 
party to a bilateral contract, unlike a unilateral one, gives the other a right to 
seek dissolution of the contract. For example, if a lessee “fails to pay the 
rent when due, the lessor may . . . dissolve the lease.”161 Similarly, “[i]f the 
buyer fails to pay the price, the seller may sue for dissolution of the sale.”162 
In Madere v. Cole, the seller of dogs was “entitled to sue” the purchaser of 
a puppy “to dissolve the sale” when the sale was perfected through 
agreement and the buyer failed to pay the price.163 In the context of a 
unilateral contract, such as a donation, however, dissolution is not the 
appropriate remedy for failure to deliver the thing donated, as confection 
of the contract through acceptance transfers “the ownership or other real 
right in the thing given.”164 Rather, the donee could sue to compel 
discovery, but dissolution of the donation hardly seems to achieve the 
donee’s goal if the donor fails to perform. 
B. Onerous and Gratuitous (and Mixed) 
Perhaps the most important distinction between types of contracts 
exists between gratuitous and onerous contracts. Unlike unilateral and 
bilateral contracts, gratuitous and onerous ones are distinguished based 
upon their cause.165 Gratuitous contracts are those in which one party 
obligates himself without doing so to obtain any advantage in return.166 By 
contrast, an onerous contract exists when each party assumes an obligation 
to obtain an advantage in exchange for his obligations.167 A donation, the 
purpose of which is to enrich another with no expectation of return, is a 
classic case of a gratuitous contract, whereas a sale, in which a thing is 
given in exchange for a price in money, is the typical onerous one. Unlike 
the characterization of bilateral and unilateral, “[w]hether a contract is an 
onerous contract or gratuitous depends in the final analysis on its cause,”168 
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not upon the parties to the contract. In the words of the late obligations 
scholar J. Denson Smith: 
If a contractant desires to confer a benefit by way of gratuity the 
resulting contract is gratuitous. Where he is not so moved the 
contract is onerous. Certain special contracts such as the loan of 
money without interest, the non-remunerative suretyship, mandate 
and deposit, and the loan for use are therefore characterized as 
gratuitous. In all these cases a benefit is conferred without 
anything being asked for or received in return.169 
The importance of cause as a basis for classifying contracts as 
gratuitous or onerous is readily apparent in the jurisprudence. Nowhere 
perhaps is the importance of cause more evident than in Larose v. Morgan, 
where the court concluded that the transfer of a house from one party to 
his son-in-law due to prior services rendered and money advanced, rather 
than for reasons of beneficence, created an onerous contract rather than a 
gratuitous one.170 Finally, in Townsend v. Urie, the court found that the 
plaintiff’s letter to the defendant constituted acceptance of his gratuitous 
offer of a bonus and thus confected an enforceable unilateral and gratuitous 
contract.171 Although the acceptance letter did contain “something in the 
nature of a compromise not to pursue legal action in lieu of enforcing the 
existing unilateral gratuitous contract,” the letter did not constitute a counter 
offer, as “the cause of the contract was [the defendant’s] generosity and 
desire to reward [the plaintiff].”172 
Although the concept of cause is well known in Louisiana law as the 
“reason”173 or, historically, the “motive” for entering into a contract,174 
ascertaining a party’s cause often poses problems for courts. The subjective 
will, although important and often essential in ascertaining contract 
formation, issues of error, and contract interpretation, must yield in some 
instances to objective declarations. “A will that is purely subjective, 
meaning that it was never expressed, is irrelevant in the eyes of the law.”175 
On the other hand, sometimes an external manifestation does not match 
the subjective or internal intent. Consequently, a holistic view of the will 
is necessary and important for purposes of our law. In other words, “a 
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judge[] will have to take the act as one single phenomenon wherein a 
certain intention—a subjective element—is thoroughly blended with a 
certain utterance—an objective element.”176 
The consequences of this classification in Louisiana law are multifold. 
First, the requirement of consent is often relaxed in the context of 
gratuitous contracts.177 In a remission, a gratuitous extinction of an 
obligation,178 acceptance by the obligor is “always presumed unless the 
obligor rejects the remission within a reasonable time.”179 Similarly, 
although an authentic act is required for a donation inter vivos,180 an 
acceptance can be made “subsequently in writing.”181 This conclusion was 
bolstered by a recent holding that a “donee’s signature on the act of 
donation is a sufficient writing to perfect the acceptance,” even though not 
itself done in an authentic act.182 
Second, gratuitous contracts usually impose a lower standard of care 
than onerous ones.183 In the context of an onerous deposit—such as a 
deposit contract in which the depositary receives compensation for his 
services—the standard of care is an objective one of “diligence and 
prudence.”184 If the deposit is gratuitous—such as a deposit contract in 
which a depositary receives no compensation for his services—however, 
the law imposes a lesser standard of care of the “same diligence and 
prudence” as a person “uses for his own property.”185 The law on mandate 
similarly imposes a general standard of diligence and prudence but then 
allows a court to “reduce the amount of loss for which the mandatory is 
liable” if the mandate is uncompensated or gratuitous.186 Ordinary 
suretyships, or those that are not compensated, also benefit from being 
“strictly construed in favor of the surety,”187 whereas the same is not the 
case for commercial suretyships.  
Third, the individual parties to the contract are presumed to be the 
principal reason for entering into a gratuitous contract such as a donation. 
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This presumption is important because errors as to “the person or the 
qualities of the other party” may constitute an error as to cause,188 and thus 
vitiate the consent necessary for a contract.189 If the contract is a gratuitous 
one, such as a donation, “the presumption obtains that the person of the 
intended obligee was the reason why the obligor bound himself.”190 French 
law is the same on this matter. Scholars have noted that gratuitous 
contracts are generally concluded “as a function of the person of the 
beneficiary” and are thus annullable for error as to the person.191 Although 
rescission of error as to the person is certainly possible in onerous 
contracts,192 no such presumption exists in the context of an onerous 
contract, such as a sale.  
Fourth, gratuitous contracts are more easily annullable when made by 
persons deprived of reason than are onerous contracts.193 The Louisiana 
Civil Code provides that “[a] contract made by a noninterdicted person 
deprived of reason at the time of contracting may be attacked after his 
death, on the ground of incapacity, only when the contract is gratuitous.”194 
An onerous contract made by such persons may be annulled only when “it 
evidences lack of understanding, or was made within thirty days of his 
death, or when application for interdiction was filed before his death.”195 
Fifth, gratuitous contracts are easier for creditors to annul under the 
revocatory action.196 That is, “[a]n oblige may attack a gratuitous contract” 
made by an obligor that causes or increases his insolvency “whether or not 
the other party knew that the contract would cause or increase the obligor’s 
insolvency.”197 With respect to an onerous contract, however, an obligee 
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can annul the contract only if the other party “knew or should have known 
that the contract would cause or increase the obligor’s insolvency.”198 
To aid in the classification of contracts, the Louisiana Civil Code, 
unlike the French Code Civil, recognizes a sort of halfway house between 
onerous and gratuitous contracts—those characterized by some scholars 
as “mixed.” These “mixed” contracts are those “by which one of the 
parties confers a benefit on the other, receiving something of inferior value 
in return, . . . such as a donation subject to a charge.”199 Relying on 
Toullier, the drafters of the 1825 Louisiana Civil Code enacted a 
mathematical test for deciding when mixed motive transactions were 
sufficiently onerous to be treated as onerous contracts or not onerous 
enough, such that they should be treated as donations, despite some 
element of onerosity.200 Thus, articles 1526 and 1527 provide that the rules 
for donations do not apply when the donation is burdened with an 
obligation or in recompense for a service, unless at the time of donation 
the obligation or the service is less than two-thirds the value of the thing 
given.201 For instance, a $10,000 donation that imposes a charge or 
obligation valued at $7,000 is subject to the rules of onerous contracts, not 
donations, because the value of the obligation exceeds two-thirds (i.e., 
$6,667) of the value of the $10,000 gift. This objective mathematical test 
serves as a surrogate for cause, making the ascertaining of a person’s 
subjective reason, motive, or cause unnecessary. As the late comparative 
scholar John Dawson has noted, “[p]sychological probes are entirely 
dispensed with where appraisal in economic terms is feasible and the 
appraisal reveals that the outlay required by the charge is substantial as 
compared with the value of the asset ‘given.’”202 
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This dichotomy—or perhaps trichotomy if “mixed” contracts are 
included—is a comprehensive one. That is, a contract must be either 
gratuitous, onerous, or mixed. It cannot then fall in the interstices of the 
classification, as has sometimes been mistakenly held by courts.203 If 
mixed, the predominate element must be ascertained under the above 
standard, and the contract must then be subjected to the rules of either the 
gratuitous regime or the onerous one.  
1. Onerous v. Bilateral and Gratuitous v. Unilateral 
The classificatory dichotomy of onerous and gratuitous, although 
overlapping, is not the same as the dichotomy between bilateral and 
unilateral contracts. In truth, all bilateral contracts are onerous.204 The very 
nature of the reciprocal obligations of a bilateral contract is at the same 
time evidence of the advantage each party obtains and thus the contract’s 
onerosity.205 A contract, however, may be onerous without, at the same 
time, being bilateral.206 A loan at interest serves as a good example of an 
onerous, unilateral contract.207 In such a case, both parties have obtained 
advantages—the borrower, the use of the thing loaned, and the lender, the 
interest. The obligations of the parties once the loan has been extended, 
however, are not reciprocal. Rather, the obligations are engendered solely 
by the borrower and thus the contract is unilateral.208  
Moreover, despite an apparent similarity in meaning, gratuitous 
contracts are not the same as unilateral contracts. Although all gratuitous 
contracts are unilateral, not all unilateral contracts are gratuitous. Loan for 
use, loan for consumption, deposit, and pledge are all unilateral contracts 
but may in fact be onerous as well as gratuitous. In all of these instances, 
the contracts are unilateral and onerous when compensation is given to the 
obligee. Because, however, no reciprocal obligation is assumed by the 
lender, depositor, or pledgor once the thing has been loaned, deposited, or 
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pledged, the contracts are still unilateral.209 Loans without interest and 
deposit and pledges for no compensation are both unilateral and gratuitous 
because the service is rendered with no benefit in exchange.210  
Although the Roman concept of mandate was always gratuitous,211 it 
is not so in current law. French law departed from the Roman idea as far 
back as 1804 and allowed a contract of mandate to be either onerous or 
gratuitous.212 The Louisiana Civil Code recognizes the same: “The 
contract of mandate may be either onerous or gratuitous.”213 The 
presumption, however, is that mandate is gratuitous, unless the parties 
agreed otherwise.214 In fact, the nearly universal position in the civil law 
world today is that mandate can be either onerous or gratuitous.215 This 
approach has been praised as the “wiser choice” to help keep the contract 
of mandate useful and realistic in the modern day.216 In either case, 
however, a mandate is a unilateral contract, even when compensation is 
paid. 
2. The Scope of Gratuitous Contracts 
Donations are the classic case of gratuitous contracts, but the contract 
of donation does not exhaust the category of gratuitous contracts. Loan for 
use, deposit, remission, and mandate can be gratuitous when they are done 
for no compensation. As gratuitous contracts, they are subject to the rules 
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for donations, such as revocation, with the exception of form.217 
Donations, of course, by their nature are always gratuitous.218 The 
Louisiana Civil Code defines a donation inter vivos as “a contract by 
which a person, called the donor, gratuitously divests himself, at present 
and irrevocably, of the thing given in favor of another, called the donee, 
who accepts it.”219 In addition to other particular rules for donations, the 
form required is an “authentic act under the penalty of absolute nullity.”220 
Charitable subscriptions, or charitable pledges, present difficult 
practical problems, even though there is no theoretical reason to treat this 
type of donation as different from other types of donations inter vivos. 
After all, a charitable subscription is a gratuitous disposition of a thing—
here a promise or pledge221—in favor of a donee, who happens to be a 
charity rather than a private person. Many systems, as a matter of policy, 
desire to enforce charitable subscriptions even in the absence of a coherent 
theory as to why. Louisiana is no exception. 
Obviously, to be enforceable as a donation inter vivos, a charitable 
pledge would need to be made via an authentic act. Unfortunately, 
charities rarely employ notaries for these purposes, which rather obviously 
would dissuade those inclined from making gifts. Nonetheless, charitable 
subscriptions, despite the lack of necessary form, have long been held to 
be enforceable in Louisiana. For example, in Baptist Hospital v. Cappel, 
the court found enforceable a pledge card that read: “For a valuable 
consideration, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and in 
consideration of the subscription of others, I hereby subscribe.”222 
Similarly, in Louisiana College v. Keller,223 the language of the pledge 
card stated simply: 
We, the subscribers, agree and bind ourselves to pay the sums 
severally annexed to our names, to any person or persons who may 
be appointed by the legislature of the State of Louisiana to receive 
the same, in behalf of a college, which may be established in the 
town of Jackson, East Feliciana. It is, however, expressly 
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understood, that no obligation is hereby created against the 
subscribers, unless the said legislature do establish a college with 
an endowment, in the said town, at their next session. And, if a 
college be established, as aforesaid, we waive all informality in 
this obligation; those who subscribe two hundred dollars or under 
to pay in equal instalments [sic] of one and two years; those who 
subscribe over two hundred dollars, to pay the amount of their 
subscriptions in annual instalments [sic] of one hundred dollars, 
subsequent to the passage of a bill relative to said institution.224 
In both cases, the charitable subscriptions were found to be enforceable, 
despite their failure to comply with the form prescribed for donations inter 
vivos.  
A charitable subscription or pledge undoubtedly could “induce the 
other party to rely on it to his detriment.”225 But article 1967, which defines 
detrimental reliance, rules out the possibility of enforcing a gratuitous 
promise, such as a charitable pledge, made in the wrong form. That article 
clearly states that “[r]eliance on a gratuitous promise made without 
required formalities is not reasonable.”226 Unsurprisingly, the courts have 
never used a detrimental reliance rationale for enforcing charitable 
subscriptions.  
Instead, Louisiana courts have engaged in a rationale that suggests that 
charitable pledges are enforceable either because they are really onerous 
contracts or because they are exempt from traditional form rules for 
donations. The courts’ rationales are admittedly unclear. For example, in 
Louisiana College, the Court suggested that a charitable subscription was 
in fact an onerous contract. The Court stated that the donor of money for 
the erection of a hospital may have done so under the expectation that he 
would derive an “advantage . . . from the establishment of a college at his 
own door, by which he would save great expense in the education of his 
children.”227 On the other hand, the Court also made statements suggesting 
that the subscription was not onerous but merely a gratuitous contract 
exempt from the form rules for donations. In this vein, the Court suggested 
that the donor’s motivation “may have been a spirit of liberality and a 
desire to be distinguished as the patron of letters.”228 The Court then 
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confusingly continued by stating, “[i]n contracts of beneficence, the 
intention to confer a benefit is a sufficient consideration.”229  
Similarly, the court in Baptist Hospital acknowledged that the 
charitable pledge made for the construction of a new nurses’ home is 
enforceable but seemed equally confused as to why.230 At one point, the 
court seemed to suggest that the pledge is onerous because the donor 
received a benefit: “Defendant does not show that any benefit he expected 
to receive from the new nurses’ home has been in any way lessened or that 
he has been in any way injured by the change in plans; therefore, he is 
bound by his pledge.”231 In another part of the opinion, however, the court 
suggested that the contract was a purely gratuitous one:  
[The defendant] testified that his purpose in making the pledge 
was to prevent the standing of the training school being withdrawn 
and thereby causing the ladies in training to lose the time they had 
spent in training there. It was his kind feeling for the young ladies 
in training and his generosity that caused him to sign the pledge.232  
Thus, the language in the existing judicial opinions concerning 
charitable subscriptions could reasonably lead one to conclude that courts 
treat charitable pledges as enforceable either because (1) they view them 
as onerous contracts exempt from traditional form requirements, or (2) 
they view them as gratuitous contracts that are de facto exempt from the 
form requirements for donations inter vivos. The Louisiana Supreme 
Court, in dicta, seems to have endorsed the former rationale:  
Close examination therefore reveals that the courts deciding such 
cases found the promises to be onerous so that they might then be 
enforced, since there was no writing requirement for the promises 
at issue if they could be characterized as onerous, as opposed to 
gratuitous promises.233 
To say that the logic of treating a gratuitous promise as an onerous 
contract is tortured is a vast understatement. First, it is hard to read cases 
such as Baptist Hosptial and Louisiana College and find any significant 
onerous component. The donors in both cases possibly made subscriptions 
                                                                                                             
 229. Id.  
 230. See Baptist Hosp. v. Cappel, 129 So. 425, 426 (La. Ct. App. 1930). 
 231. Id. at 427.  
 232. Id. 
 233. Morris v. Friedman, 663 So. 2d 19, 24 (La. 1995). For an informative 
essay in support of the court’s position, see Thomas B. Lemann, Enforceability of 
Charitable Pledges, 2 CIV. L. COMMENTS. 1 (2009). 




because they wanted to either have a “college at his own door” or a nurses’ 
home nearby.234 But even if that were true as a factual matter, this hardly 
seems to be a significant enough degree of onerosity to make the entire 
transaction onerous or to make the donor’s “cause” for making the 
donation the close proximity of the institution. This is especially true in 
the Baptist Hospital case where the court suggests that the “[d]efendant 
does not show that any benefit he expected to receive . . . has been in any 
way lessened” by the relocation of the nurses’ home.235  
Second, the other reasons the courts offer for finding the contract to 
be onerous simply make little sense. The Court in Louisiana College 
suggests that the donor may have been motivated by the “desire to be 
distinguished as the patron of letters.”236 Certainly, however, that is not an 
onerous motive. No one would doubt that birthday gifts made by friends 
or relatives are “purely gratuitous,” even if they are only made by the 
desire to be distinguished as a good friend or beneficent relative of the 
recipient. Certainly a contract is gratuitous even if a donor’s internal 
motivation is less than 100% pure. Courts do not and should not inquire 
into the quality of one’s mind when making an uncompensated gift. After 
all, the very definition of a gratuitous contract is one in which one party is 
benefited “without [the other] obtaining any advantage in return.”237 
Psychological benefits of being known as a good mother, a good friend, or 
a patron of letters are surely outside the scope of the benefits contemplated 
by article 1910 of the Civil Code. If they were not, the category of 
gratuitous contracts would arguably cease to exist altogether.  
A better explanation for why charitable subscriptions are enforceable 
is simply that they are a special form of gratuitous contract and thus that 
they are exempt from the form requirements for donations inter vivos, just 
as other gratuitous contracts are. This is not only faithful to the existing 
jurisprudence on the topic of charitable pledges, but it is also more 
logically defensible. Cases such as Baptist Hospital and Louisiana College 
stand for the proposition that charitable subscriptions are enforceable 
without using an authentic act. Having rejected their characterization as 
onerous contracts, the explanation as to their enforceability must lie 
elsewhere. Because these subscriptions are unquestionably gratuitous in 
nature, the requirement of the authentic act exists only for transactions that 
are traditionally characterized as donations inter vivos, not for all contracts 
that are gratuitous in nature.238 Many types of gratuitous contracts are not 
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subject to the form requirements for a donation inter vivos. For example, 
a remission of debt is a gratuitous contract that can be accomplished 
without an authentic act, as can uncompensated loans, mandates, pledges, 
and deposits.239 Despite the similarity between charitable subscriptions 
and donations, a more practical treatment of charitable subscriptions may 
demand that they be treated like other gratuitous contracts that are not 
subject to the burdensome authentic act form or perhaps as merely a 
jurisprudential and customary exception to the rule of article 1541. Such a 
distinction appears completely appropriate, given the societal desire to 
facilitate these gratuitous pledges.  
Finally, the Louisiana Supreme Court has stated that “where a 
Louisiana Civil Code article has been derived from a French Civil Code 
article, interpretation of the latter is highly instructive for, if not 
determinative of, the interpretation of the former.”240 Although some 
French cases have similarly adopted the characterization of pledges as 
onerous contracts,241 Planiol, in his treatise on French civil law, adopts a 
different rationale: 
Subscriptions opened to create or sustain a work of charity of 
public utility are donations which ought to fall within the principle 
of solemnity, inasmuch as there is no text which excepts such 
donations. But practically, the multiplicity and the small amount 
of the individual subscriptions make the use of solemn forms 
impossible . . . . It is thus preferable to consider this as a special 
contract, sanctioned by reason of custom, a contract which is not 
a donation but serves to realize a liberality.242  
More recent authors on comparative donations law agree. Richard 
Hyland in a work on the comparative law of gifts has stated the following 
with regard to the French law of charitable subscriptions: 
The case law appears to validate charitable subscriptions as 
indirect gifts sui generis. Because only modest sums are generally 
involved, notarial form is impractical. . . . In deciding that such 
gifts are exempt from form requirements, the Cassation Court 
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employs the same language that is often used to validate indirect 
gifts.243  
Whatever the rationale, charitable pledges are enforceable in 
Louisiana and elsewhere even without an authentic act. This Article 
suggests that they are special gratuitous contracts, by virtue of custom and 
practice, that should be treated as such and not as donations inter vivos. 
Consequently, they are exempt from the traditional form requirements for 
donations inter vivos and in compliance with the general rules of gratuitous 
contracts. 
C. Commutative, Independent, Aleatory, and Certain 
Perhaps the most vexing conceptual puzzle in the modern Louisiana 
contract classification scheme is the one distinguishing commutative from 
aleatory contracts and differentiating commutative contracts from bilateral 
ones. The biggest innovation in this area was the addition in 1825 and then 
subsequent deletion in 1984 of “independent” contracts in contrast to 
“commutative” ones and “certain” contracts in contrast to “aleatory” 
ones.244 Common law sources, which have been suggested as a possible 
source for these additions,245 do not appear fruitful, as Anglo-American 
treatises on contract law were largely unknown in the eighteenth century 
and Blackstone gives little time to the topic of contracts in his 
commentaries.246 Powell, writing in 1790, published the first doctrinal 
work on contract law. But no evidence of the newly added contracts can 
be found in Powell (1790),247 or in Comyn (1823),248 Newland (1821),249 
or Colebrooke (1818)250—the latter of whom demonstrates a heavy 
reliance on Pothier and Roman law. Colebrooke, writing in 1818, 
however, distinguishes commutative contracts from contingent ones and 
notes that in commutative contracts the equivalent is exchanged, but when 
the “equivalent consist[s] in the risk of loss, or the chance of gain, 
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dependent on an uncertain event, the contract is contingent and aleatory 
or hazardous.”251 Pothier, on whom Colebrooke appears to rely, makes a 
similar juxtaposition and provides a similar explanation.252 Still absent, 
however, is the distinction between “aleatory” and “certain” contracts 
adopted by the revision of 1825. Story, writing in 1856, observes a 
distinction between an “absolute contract,” defined simply as “an 
agreement to do or not to do something, at all events,” and a “conditional” 
one, defined as “a contract, whose very existence and performance depend 
on a contingency and condition.”253 
1. The Division in the 1825 Code 
Despite the historical uncertainty of the origin of independent and 
certain contracts, the divisions or classes of contracts set out by the 1825 
Civil Code and preserved in Louisiana law until 1984 did create a 
seemingly sensible pairing for contracts, even though different from the 
French. Commutative contracts were defined as “those in which what is 
done, given or promised by one party, is considered as equivalent to, or a 
consideration for what is done, given or promised by the other.”254 In 
contrast, independent contracts were “those in which the mutual acts or 
promises have no relation to each other, either as equivalents or as 
considerations.”255 This distinction was one “in relation to [the contracts’] 
substance.”256 What was essential was an interdependence between the 
parties’ obligations. The Expose des Motifs suggests that this distinction 
was introduced to make clear the application of the defense of non-
performance: “The redactors of the Civil Code of 1825 were greatly 
concerned with the exceptio non adimpleti contractus. That concern, no 
doubt, led them to introduce the distinction between ‘commutative’ and 
‘independent’ contracts.”257 In other words, when one party to a dependent 
obligation does not perform his obligation, the other party is not obliged 
to perform his. On the other hand, if obligations are independent of each 
other, nonperformance of one would give the other party a claim for 
specific performance or damages but would not serve as basis for not 
performing his own independent obligation. For example, in Poole v. 
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Ward, the court found that a donation of a fractional interest in various 
certificates of deposit in connection with the donees subsequent agreement 
not to contest the succession proceedings through which the donor had 
inherited the interest were not separate independent obligations but were 
rather two dependent ones that formed part of the same compromise.258 
Considered in terms of the “effects” of the contracts, the 1825 Civil 
Code noted that contracts could be “certain” or “aleatory.”259 The object 
of certain contracts would occur “in the usual course of events,” but 
performance under an aleatory contract depended upon “an uncertain 
event.”260 In truth, the category of “certain” contracts seems somewhat 
artificial and expounded only to provide a residual category for all those 
ordinary contracts where performance was not dependent upon an 
uncertainty. 
2. The Division in Modern Law 
Present law, however, omits “independent” and “certain” and creates 
an apparent pairing between commutative and aleatory contracts. The 
current Louisiana Civil Code defines a commutative contract as one in 
which “the performance of the obligation of each party is correlative to the 
performance of the other.”261 No explanation, however, of what is meant 
by “correlative” is provided.262 Comment (b) to article 1911 reminds the 
reader of the importance of the term, whatever it might mean: “correlative 
performances are the essential feature of commutative contracts.”263 Lest 
one think this definition is reminiscent of the definition of “bilateral 
contracts,” the reader is quickly reminded that “[a] distinction is thus made 
between correlative obligations, which make a contract bilateral . . . and 
correlative performances, which make the contract, not only bilateral but 
also commutative.”264 Comment (c) then proceeds to explain that the 
“correlative performances” of commutative contracts, rather than 
correlative obligations of bilateral ones, “set[] forth the ground for the 
traditional defense of nonperformance (exceptio non adimpleti contractus) 
that operates in the sphere of commutative contracts alone.”265 After all, 
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article 2022 provides that “[e]ither party to a commutative contract may 
refuse to perform his obligation if the other has failed to perform or does 
not offer to perform his own at the same time, if the performances are due 
simultaneously.”266 Simultaneity of performances, then, is suggested by 
this comment and article 2022 as the hallmark of commutative contracts 
under the current law—a conclusion bolstered by comment (c) to the very 
article, which provides that it applies “only where the performances of the 
parties are to be rendered simultaneously.”267 By way of clarification, the 
comment continues to provide an example of a bilateral contract that 
cannot benefit from this article, even though the obligations are reciprocal, 
because the performances are not due simultaneously: “[the article] does 
not apply where the performances are not to be rendered simultaneously 
as in the case of a lease.”268 
But this is surely a mistake. The defense of non-performance is more 
appropriately applied to bilateral contracts, not commutative ones. 
Although the text of article 2022 seems to limit its application to 
“commutative” contracts, it should not be further limited by the comments 
suggesting that performance is due simultaneously. The simultaneity 
explanation of commutative contracts has been ably critiqued by Alain 
Levasseur, who has noted that, under this approach, the non-reciprocity of 
performances could exist only when one performance is subject either to 
a suspensive term or a suspensive condition.269 In either instance, 
classification of the performances as “correlative” seems a poor way to 
express the code articles on term and condition.270 Additionally, it is hard 
to see what such a characterization adds to the Civil Code “except for 
confusion and redundancy.”271 
Indeed, the comments to the Civil Code requiring simultaneity of 
performances appear to have confused commutative contracts with those 
recognized in French contracts as being due instantaneously as opposed to 
successively. French scholars recognize this distinction as being 
traditional even if not part of formal French law. Terré, Simler, and 
Lequette write of contracts à execution instantanée, which give rise to 
obligations susceptible of being executed at one time, such as a sale or 
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exchange.272 Simultaneity of performance is not part of the law and should 
not be read into the requirements of commutative contracts. 
The revision documents appear to show that no change in meaning 
was intended when the definition of commutative contracts was altered 
from requiring “equivalents” to requiring “correlative performances.” In 
fact, the concept of “equivalents” apparently was removed from 
commutative contracts in a somewhat ill-fated attempt to clarify the law. 
The reporter of the revision of the law of contracts explained the changes 
as follows: 
The word “equivalent” may suggest more than it really means. In 
fact, if [Civil Code] article 1768 is read alone, it would seem that 
an exchange of equivalent values is required. If read together with 
[articles] 1860 and 1861, however, it becomes clear that, for the 
sale of immovable at least, price and value of the thing are 
regarded as equivalent when the former is no less than one half of 
the latter. In such a context, all that is accomplished by the use of 
the word “equivalent” is to connote an element of exchange. As 
such element is also connoted by the word “commutative,” the 
term “equivalent” may be eliminated from [article] 1768 without 
altering its meaning. The word “equivalent” was written into 
article 1104 of the Code Napoleon, from where it found its way 
into [Louisiana Civil Code article] 1768, owing to the writings of 
Pothier. A more realistic approach to commutative contracts is 
very much in order today.273 
But exact equivalents have never been required of commutative contracts, 
as even Aquinas provided that relief should only be granted for “large 
deviations” or laesio enormis.274 As further evidence that the modern 
revision was not intended to usher in a new approach, comment (a) to 
current article 1911 also makes clear that the 1984 revision “does not 
change the law.”275 The idea of performances being considered as 
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“equivalent[s]” then should not be read strictly but still remains a part of 
the concept of commutative contracts.  
The juxtaposition of the article on “commutative” contracts with the 
one immediately succeeding it on “aleatory” contracts, however, suggests 
that more than mere “equivalence” is required. From a stylistic point, it 
would be odd to have articles 1911 and 1912 operate independent of each 
other and thus without any correspondence, given that the classification 
articles in the Civil Code are provided in pairs: 1907 and 1908 on unilateral 
and bilateral contracts; 1909 and 1910 on onerous and gratuitous contracts; 
1913 on principal and accessory ones; and 1914 on nominate and 
innominate ones.276 But the definition of an aleatory contract as 
“uncertain” hardly seems the opposite of the definition of a commutative 
one without building into commutative contracts the concept of 
“certainty” of performance and equivalence. The Quebec Civil Code has 
adopted this approach and states that “[a] contract is commutative when, 
at the time it is formed, the extent of the obligations of the parties and of 
the advantages obtained by them in return is certain and determinate.”277  
The prior law did just that and paired “certain or aleatory” contracts 
together.278 The French Code Civil likewise discusses commutative 
(commutatif) and aleatory (aléatoire) contracts in the same article, creating 
the same correspondence between the two in light of surrounding articles 
discussing unilateral and bilateral and onerous and gratuitous contracts.279 
In combining the concepts of “equivalence” and “certainty” for 
commutative contracts, the characteristic quality of commutative contracts 
in contrast to aleatory ones is that in the former the performances are 
interdependent and their equivalence is immediately obvious and certain, 
whereas in the latter no such interdependence or equivalence is required. 
Further, the uncertainty of the performance of an aleatory contract or the 
extent thereof often depends upon subsequent events, such as when an 
insurance contract pays out an uncertain amount only upon the occurrence 
of an uncertain event. Similarly, many French commentators write about 
commutative and aleatory contracts as if they are two sides of the same 
coin. Denis Tallon explains that commutative contracts, in contrast to 
aleatory ones, require some knowledge of the certainty of what is owed by 
noting that the difference is “the possibility of estimating at the time of 
concluding the contract the scope of what is owed.”280 Other 
commentators have explained that commutative contracts are “susceptible 
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to be immediately evaluated and not dependent, after the contract, on an 
eventual uncertainty,” such as a sale of a house or a rent of an apartment.281 
Similarly, Amos and Walton write that a contract is commutative “when 
the extent of the [performances] which are owed by each of the parties is 
immediately apparent.”282 Planiol and Ripert provide similarly.283 In fact, 
Planiol explains the difference as follows: 
[C]ommutative [contracts] are those in which each of the 
contracting parities receives an equivalent for what he gives, as in 
the contract of sale, the seller ought to give the thing sold, and 
receive a price, which is the equivalent; the buyer ought to give 
the price, and receive the thing sold, which is the equivalent. . . . 
Aleatory (or hazardous) contracts are those by which one of the 
contracting parties, without contributing any thing on his part, 
receives something from the other, not by way of gift, but as a 
compensation for the risk which he runs. All games of chance, 
wagers, and contracts of insurance, are contracts of this 
description.284 
As evident from the above, the functions and definitions of both 
“commutative” and “aleatory” contracts under current law are not 
significantly different from their predecessors in the code of 1870. Both 
current article 1912 and prior article 1776 are clear that a contract is 
aleatory when performance “depends upon an uncertain event.”285 
Comment (a) to article 1912 makes clear that the 1984 revision “does not 
change the law.”286 
In fact, correct thinking reveals that commutative and aleatory contracts 
have an additional correspondence, as both are sub-classifications of 
onerous contracts.287 French law is clear that neither commutative contracts 
nor aleatory ones can be gratuitous because the intent in performing each 
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is to secure a counter performance.288 Because onerous contracts are those 
in which each party performs in order to procure a counter performance, 
one can readily see that if that performance is certain and regarded as 
equivalent, then the performances are correlative and the contracts are 
commutative.289 If performances are subordinated to a hope or chance, 
they are aleatory.290 In addition to being onerous contracts, commutative 
and aleatory contracts under the Louisiana Civil Code are also bilateral as 
the defining civil code articles require that more than one party must 
assume or undertake a performance or an obligation.291 
The significance of this distinction is seen primarily in the case of the 
defense of nonperformance as discussed above. In addition, lesion is 
allowable in cases of commutative contracts but never in the case of 
aleatory ones.292 Although the articles on lesion do not by their terms limit 
their application to commutative contracts, it is clear that the basic 
conceptions of commutative justice espoused by Aristotle and built into 
contract law by the late scholastics and subsequent scholars limit this 
remedy to instances of commutative justice when equivalents are 
exchanged but not ultimately provided. Louisiana law has likewise limited 
this remedy to commutative contracts. In McDonald v. Grande Corp., the 
court refused to cancel a mineral lease and concluded that “[t]he 
enforcement of [aleatory] contracts cannot be avoided on the grounds of 
lesion, the chances of loss being of the essence in that kind of contract and 
compensated by the chances of gain.”293 
In short, the modern Louisiana Civil Code leaves much to be desired 
in its presentation of commutative and aleatory contracts. Although 
purporting to clarify the law, the latest revision seems to have created more 
confusion than it avoided and created more uncertainty than is merited, 
especially in light of the relative unimportance of this dichotomy. Even so, 
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this comparative and historical analysis suggests that the distinction might 
still be tenable. 
D. Principal and Accessory 
The fourth distinction of contracts in Louisiana law is that between 
principal and accessory.294 Principal contracts are those in which secured 
obligations arise by virtue of a contract, whereas accessory ones are made 
to “provide security for the performance of an obligation.”295 The meaning 
of this dichotomy is clear. “A principal contract is one which can stand on 
its own; it needs no legal (contractual or otherwise) support than its own 
to exist . . . .”296 An accessory contract, on the other hand, needs a principal 
contract to exist. It supports and bolsters a principal contract but cannot 
exist on its own. A sale, lease, and loan are principal contracts, whereas a 
suretyship, mortgage, or pledge is an accessory one.297  
The distinction between the principal and accessory contracts is 
obvious but important. An accessory contract cannot exist without a 
principal one, but the reverse is not true.298 A mortgage is not valid once 
the loan has been extinguished. A pledge is not enforceable if the 
underlying obligation is not valid. The invalidity of a suretyship or other 
accessory obligation, however, does not affect the validity of the 
underlying principal obligation.  
E. Nominate and Innominate 
The fifth and final distinction in Louisiana contract law is between 
nominate and innominate contracts.299 Nominate contracts are those with 
special designation or names, such as “sale, lease, loan, or insurance.”300 
Innominate contracts are those “with no special designation.”301 The 
distinction is important because nominate contracts, such as sale or lease, 
are governed by special rules, whereas innominate ones are subject to the 
general rules on contracts. Unlike Roman law, the classification of the 
contract does not affect its enforceability. As stated long ago by the 
Louisiana Supreme Court, “[i]f there be a valid existing cause for a 
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contract, it is immaterial that it should not fall under some contract 
particularly named or classified in the Code.”302 In Thielman v. Gahlman, 
a grantor conveyed property to a grantee in exchange for support and a 
home during the life of the grantor and burial after death.303 Given the 
uncertainty involved in the grantee’s performance, the court appropriately 
noted that this contract was aleatory and thus could not be attacked on the 
grounds of lesion.304 Moreover, given the performances to be exchanged 
in this bilateral contract and the uncertainty as to the price, this contract 
was innominate and thus subject to the general rules on contracts.  
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the classification of contracts clearly has a long history 
in the civil law. Although the purpose of classifying contracts has changed 
over the years, almost as much as the categories themselves, modern law 
still attaches many important consequences to the classification scheme. 
Through the use of historical analysis and comparative research, this 
Article has articulated and clarified those consequences.  
It is beyond cavil that the scheme adopted by the drafters of the 
Louisiana Civil Code is far from perfect, and this Article has not been 
reluctant to criticize the modern approach. The current classification 
system, however, is still relevant for ascertaining remedies and, in many 
instances, the applicable law. As has been noted elsewhere, “in matters of 
law, as it is also the case in other sciences, classifications should always 
be taken with some reservations.”305 Classification systems are useful as 
rules of thumb, but must not be pursued blindly and without attention to 
the outcomes they produce.306 Cautious skepticism should always prevail, 
as Louisiana’s contract classification systems are “but tentative conceptual 
schemes that are valid only to the extent they are useful. When they cease 
to be useful, they should be abandoned.”307 The Romans realized this when 
they allowed for the enforceability of a variety of innominate contracts 
outside their traditional four-fold system. Louisiana scholars, judges, and 
lawyers should, too. 
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